

OS REGISTRY

FILE *Security 18*

*Also: Personnel 7*

22 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :  Chairman  
NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation

SUBJECT : Organization to Manage APEX Special  
Access System

One of the tasks of my Working Group is to come up with recommendations on any organizational adjustments which should be made to implement and administer the APEX Program. I have drafted the attached paper on this subject, but have not discussed it with any members of my group. Before I surface it, I would appreciate any reactions or suggestions you may have.

cc: DDA  
D/Security ✓  
C/Community Security Group

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Organization for the APEX Special Access Control System

1. Upon implementation of the APEX system, there will be a need to consolidate a number of Community functions associated with this single special access system which currently are being carried out by at least five organizations in the Community. They are: CIA, NSA, the DCI Security Committee, COMIREX, and the SIGINT Committee.

Mission and Functions

2. The central Community organization for the APEX system would have as its overall mission serving as the DCI's staff arm for:

- the development of common security and access standards for managing and handling compartmented foreign intelligence systems, information, and products.
- the establishment of special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive classified information.

3. In carrying out the above missions, the APEX organization would be responsible for the following specific functions:

a.. Overall management of the APEX security control system and the development of APEX security policy.

b. Staff for the DCI the reviews and approvals required for programs contained within the APEX system, including projects approved for the  dissemination system.

c. Oversight of APEX matters in all organizations outside the Intelligence Community and with foreign participants in the APEX system, with the exception of those foreign liaison matters specifically delegated by the DCI to other NFIB principals.

d. Responsibility for the development of APEX policy and procedural manuals and coordination of any

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implementing guidance manuals or procedures developed by other organizations participating in the APEX system.

e. Establish and staff the Community mechanism for exercising the right of challenge to classification or compartmentation of APEX materials and providing guidance on security classification and downgrading and the de-compartmentation or sanitization of APEX materials.

f. Develop Community policy guidance and procedures for the release of APEX materials to foreign governments and liaison services.

g. Development of the APEX Central Access Approval Registry and review and staffing of requests for changes and allocations of APEX ceilings and access approvals, including administrative access approvals.

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h. Policy direction and guidance for the APEX network of APEX Control Officers, APEX Security Officers, and  Control Officers, including (1) security indoctrination procedures for briefings and debriefings of personnel cleared for access to APEX, (2) the personnel, physical, and technical security programs for the protection of APEX materials, and (3) Community standards for document control, including markings, control systems, transmittal procedures, and inventory and accountability procedures.

i. Development of policies and procedures for access by contractors and consultants to APEX materials.

#### Staffing and Resources

4. My preliminary thoughts regarding staffing arrangements and resource requirements are as follows:

a. A number of the responsibilities listed above are presently carried out by the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees. I would remove these responsibilities and the associated resources from the jurisdiction of these two Committees.

b. Others of these responsibilities are presently carried on by the DCI Security Committee, and parts of

the Office of Security, such as the Compartmented Information Branch. I also would move these functions and associated resources to the new organization.

c. I would change radically the staffing pattern of the new organization compared with the existing staffing patterns of the organizations named above. Rather than have a cadre of people who are almost uniquely expert in security matters or in the specific disciplines of COMINT or Imagery collection, the new organization should be staffed on a much more catholic basis. A small cadre of Security, Imagery, and SIGINT specialists is necessary. The remainder of the staff should include representatives from:

- other collection activities, e.g., NSA, Navy.
- other processing organizations, e.g., NPIC, OIA.
- user organizations, e.g., NFAC, DIA Production, and INR.

5. To preserve the momentum and thrust of the program, the initial chief of the organization should be from the user community. He should also be of sufficient status--supergrade level--to deal with senior members of the Community.

6. This new organization should be viewed clearly as a Community organization reporting to the DCI through his Deputy for Community Support. Each of the principal members of the NFIB should be required to detail officers to serve rotational tours with this organization.

7. The functions of this organization would require an estimated 25 to 28 positions. This would include the 12 positions in the Compartmented Information Branch of CIA's Office of Security which would move intact to the new organization. One staffing arrangement for the organization might be as follows:

Office of the Chief -- Chief, Deputy and two secretaries. The Deputy would also have direct responsibilities for the  dissemination system.

Security Staff -- Two-three professionals and one secretary.

Imagery Staff	--	Two-three professionals and one secretary.
Signals Staff	--	Two-three professionals and one secretary.
APEX Control Access Approval Registry	--	Two professionals, two technical and eight clerical employees

8. Based on present commitments (positions or man-year equivalents) to activities similar to those to be performed by the new organization, 20 of the required 28 positions are immediately identifiable:

COMIREX	--	3 positions
SIGINT Committee	--	2 positions
Compartmentation Branch, DCI Security Committee	--	3 positions
Compartmented Information Branch, Office of Security, CIA	--	12 positions

9. The remaining eight positions could be provided by the DCI as a matter of Community concern, or, if an ecumenical spirit should ever prevail, those Community members with real stakes in the working of the system could provide resources. NSA, for example, could be asked to underwrite two positions and the following to underwrite one position-- NRO, NPIC, Navy, CIA/DDS&T/OSO, CIA/NFAC, and DIA.